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21. Introduction
Financially developed economies repeatedly experience episodes in which patterns
of behavior spread rapidly through the population and then culminate in dramatic
adverse events. Examples of such episodes include the fast spread of stock market
participation in the 1990s leading up to the burst of the dot-com bubble, and the
spread of excessive borrowing against home equity leading to the more recent global
nancial crisis. In the face of such large scale and systemically important events,
it is natural to ask: what is the role of social interactions and peer e¤ects for the
spread of nancial behavior in the general population?
It is well understood that there are two broad channels through which social
interactions may a¤ect individuals decisions. The rst channel is one of direct
information ow, i.e. of direct communication and dissemination of information and
knowledge between individuals. The second is a channel of imitation of the behavior
of peers, either mindful or mindless. Imitation of peers is mindful when they are
perceived to be knowledgeable or well-informed and thus their actions convey useful
information. In contrast, imitation is mindless when the actions of peers convey no
intrinsic information. While both types of imitation may be widespread in practice,
they are di¢ cult to disentangle. But being able to disentangle informative social
interactions, namely the exchange of information and mindful imitation on the one
hand, from mindless imitation on the other, is of fundamental importance for both
the understanding of nancial and aggregate macroeconomic outcomes, and the
design and conduct of public policy.1
In this paper, we focus on individualsdecisions on stock market participation
and exposure. We examine whether social interactions matter for such decisions
and investigate whether there is a signicant role for informative social interactions
in stockholding behavior alongside a possible role for mindless imitation. Our nd-
ings support that, in a nancially developed economy with a mature stock market,
pure information does indeed ow between individuals who interact socially when
it comes to stock market participation and conditional portfolio shares. Our work
makes two important contributions. First, we provide evidence of a sizeable and sta-
tistically signicant information channel, operating on di¤erent levels: perceptions
of realised returns, expectations of future returns, and stockholding behavior con-
ditional on expectations. Our results also suggest that imitation in stock markets
may sometimes be present, but is not the most important channel through which
1This was also highlighted in a recent keynote lecture by Christopher Caroll, titled Hetero-
geneity, Macroeconomics and Reality, at the Sloan-BoE-OFR Conference on Heterogeneous Agent
Macroeconomics, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Sep. 2017.
3social interactions inuence stockholding behavior.2 Second, our ndings point to
a clear mechanism by which social interactions within a competitive market a¤ect
individualsexpectations of stock market returns and stockholdings. Specically, we
nd evidence of an informational channel: social interactions improve individuals
perceptions of realised stock market returns, which in turn inuence expectations
and thereby, stock market participation and conditional portfolio shares. Overall,
our ndings provide support for the view that social interactions do not simply
produce mindless imitation of nancial behavior of the social circle, but allow the
transfer of relevant knowledge.
Broadly, our strategy for establishing the presence of an information channel can
be summarized as follows. First, we set out a theoretical framework for analyzing
stock market investment decisions that allows for information dissemination via
social interactions, within a competitive market setting. Based on this framework,
we derive a set of well-dened testable predictions. With these predictions in hand,
we design and eld a unique and novel survey in order to collect data to test these
predictions and empirically examine how robust they are.
Next, we provide a detailed description of how we establish the presence of an
information channel for stock market decisions. The starting point of our analysis is
to model direct communication and information dissemination between individuals,
within a large e¢ cient nancial market.3 Within that framework, individuals receive
private signals about asset returns, as well as publicly available information from
equilibrium asset prices, and locally available information from their peers, friends
and acquaintances, to whom they are connected through a well-dened informa-
tion network. Such a framework extends Ozsoylev and Walden (2011) to individual
heterogeneity in both risk preferences and signal precisions, in line with available em-
pirical evidence. Heterogeneity in risk preferences allows us to distinguish between
risk and information driven nancial decisions.4 Heterogeneity in signal precision
provides a platform for distinguishing individuals that are well informed about the
stock market from those that are less informed. A key prediction of the model is
therefore that individuals with higher risk-adjusted connectedness, i.e. those with
2Our results are consistent with those of Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duo and Jackson (2013)
who show this in context of small markets in nancially developping economies, in particular Indian
villages.
3Recent work by Blume, Brock, Durlauf and Jayaraman (2015) provides a rigorous derivation
of the equilibrium underpinnings of social utility driven (or endorsement, or imitation based) peer
e¤ects for the standard linear-in-means econometric specication of social interactions models.
However, no such micro-foundation exists for information driven peer e¤ects.
4Cabrales, Gossner and Serrano (2013 and 2017) show that in equilibrium, more risk tolerant
individuals are willing to pay more for information; therefore, less risk averse agents may have more
and/or better informed social connections.
4more and/or more informative social interactions, invest more in risky assets, in re-
sponse to good signals and for given risk tolerance. This is because well-connected
individuals pool both more and more precise privately received signals from indi-
viduals they are acquainted with, increasing the precision of their conditional stock
market return expectations.
With this prediction in hand, we design, eld and exploit novel survey data
from a representative sample by age, asset classes and wealth of the population of
France, collected in two stages, in December 2014 and May 2015. The survey ques-
tionnaire provides measures of stock market participation and risky portfolio share,
risk attitudes, connectedness within the network of peers, perceived characteristics
of respondentspeers stock market participation and information, and importantly,
probabilistically elicited subjective expectations and perceptions of stock market re-
turns. It also contains specic questions designed to obtain quantitative measures
of relevant network characteristics that enable identication of information network
e¤ects on nancial decisions from individual answers. Finally, the questionnaire
contains a very rich set of covariates for socioeconomic and demographic controls,
preferences, constraints, and access and frequency of consultation of information
sources, typically absent from empirical studies of social networks.
The survey was designed with four features in mind. First, the mechanism
through which social interactions matter for nancial decisions can be empirically
identied from respondentsanswers to questions on beliefs and perceptions of stock
market returns, when combined with data on measures of access and frequency of
consultation of both publicly and privately available information sources (see Blume,
Brock, Durlauf and Jayaraman, 2015). Second, in order to circumvent Manskis
(1993) reection problem that arises when social interactions are identied empir-
ically from linear-in-means econometric specications (see Blume, Brock, Durlauf
and Ioannides, 2011), we do not control for average actual peer behavior but for re-
spondentsperceived peer behavior.5 Third, the survey is done over a representative
sample of a population of a nancially developed country (namely France), with
a mature stock market and abundant publicly available information. Fourth, our
main identication strategy for disentangling knowlegde transfer, mindful imitation,
and mindless imitation, is based on reported perceptions of respondents regarding
5When respondentspreferences contain a social utility component, peer behaviour a¤ects indi-
vidual behaviour through the individual best response (Blume et al. 2011, 2015). However, when
the social utility component is absent from individual preferences, our theoretical framework implies
that peer behaviour and information enter individual best responses only through expectations of
returns, i.e. only to the extent that they contain some information. Therefore, and since the stock
market is non-manipulable from an individuals perspective, peer information or behaviour has no
direct inuence on individual behaviour and there is no purely informative endogenous peer e¤ect.
5the stock market behavior and information of three circles: the nancial circle, i.e.
peers with whom they discuss nancial matters; their overall social circle of friends
and acquaintances; and the overall population, about whom they have general views
without systematic social interaction.6 We elaborate further on this nal feature
next.
Our theoretical framework incorporates heterogeneity in signal precision, which
allows for the possibility that social interactions with ones peers may be more or
less informative, depending on how well informed or knowledgeable ones peers are.
Using the responses about the nancial and social circles, we can construct respon-
dents perceptions about the behavior and information of peers from the outer circle.
We think of a respondents outer circle as the subset of the social circle that is the
complement of the nancial circle. i.e., those peers with whom respondents may
interact with socially, but do not discuss own nancial matters. Within-individual
variation in the responses regarding the behavior and information of the two com-
ponents of a respondents social circle (nancial and outer) allows us to identify
informative peer e¤ects on the respondents own behavior, expectations and per-
ceptions about the stock market, while controlling for how the respondent perceives
others in general (the overall population). Additionally, within-individual variation
in the responses regarding the same attributes of now the whole social circle and
the overall population enables identication of overall social interactions e¤ects on
individual behavior, expectations or perceptions about the stock market.
This novel triple circle methodological approach helps us separate both pure
information exchange from mindful imitation, and mindful from mindless imitation,
while controlling for unobserved factors inuencing how the respondent perceives
others and the economy in general. We exploit information on respondent per-
ceptions of the three circles in a number of di¤erent ways. First, by controlling
for these perceptions in regressions; second, by conducting placebo tests, where re-
sponses about the circles are reshu­ ed for respondents of the same age, education,
and location; and third, by modeling the joint decision to have a nancial circle and
to participate in the stock market.
We nd that respondentsperceptions about the shares of their nancial circles
that are informed about the stock market or actively participating in it are sys-
tematically related to respondents perceptions and expectations of stock market
returns, the probability of stock market participation, and the risky portfolio share
conditional on participation. Respondents who perceive their nancial circles to be
6 In our data, we nd that the nancial circle is typically small relative to the social circle. On
average it contains three to ve people, relative to an average size of 53 people for the social circle
in France.
6more informed or more widely participating in the stock market have perceptions
of returns that are closer to the truth. In contrast, the e¤ects of respondentsper-
ceptions about how informed their outer social circles and the population are on
expectations of stock market returns are statistically insignicant. Importantly, the
extent to which respondents perceive their nancial circle to be informed about or
participating in the stock market a¤ects expectations of returns only through im-
proved perceptions of (recently realised) returns. If the e¤ect of social interactions
on stockholding were to run only through expectations of returns without a¤ecting
perceptions, then we would not be able to exclude the possibility that individuals
simply mimic the optimism of those they interact with, without in fact being bet-
ter informed about the stock market. Our nding that the e¤ect on expectations
runs solely through improved perceptions about past stock market returns strongly
corroborates the presence of an information e¤ect of peers on stockholding behavior.
While the relevance of information in the nancial circle points to informative
interactions, the relevance of participation allows for both information exchange and
mindful imitation of peers perceived to be knowledgeable about nancial matters.
Our analysis also indicates traces of mindless imitation in stockholding behavior.
In particular, we nd that respondents may be inuenced by the nancial behavior
of those in their outer social circle, even though they do not consider them knowl-
edgeable in nancial matters. Interestingly, this e¤ect does not run either through
perceptions or expectations. Based on this, and on the fact that respondents do
not engage in nancial discussions with their outer social circles by construction,
this can be interpreted as mindless imitation that does not permeate as many layers
of the stockholding decision as informative interactions and mindful imitation of
informed peers do.
We employ a number of robustness checks that corroborate our main ndings.
First, to assess the relevance of unobserved heterogeneity, we make use of the triple
circle approach. As a rst line of attack, we split the social circle of respondents
into nancial and outer circles and do placebo tests. If indeed respondents and
their social circles all follow and/or invest in the stock market (or refrain from doing
so) because people tend to socialize with those that are similar to them and face
common unobserved factors, then we would expect to see positive and signicant
e¤ects of the knowledge and participation of both the nancial and outer circles on
perceptions, expectations, participation, and conditional portfolio share of respon-
dents. Lack of statistical signicance of perceptions regarding how informed the
outer circle is argues against unobserved heterogeneity. By additionally controlling
for perceptions regarding the population, we are controlling for how respondents
7see others in general and we get the di¤erential e¤ect of belonging in the nancial or
the outer social circle. However, it can be argued that lack of statistical signicance
of outer circle variables can be caused by attenuation bias: respondents are less
knowledgeable about their outer circle as they do not discuss nancial matters with
them. To guard against this possibility, we focus on the nancial circle only and
conduct placebo tests reshu­ ing perceptions of the nancial circle among respon-
dents of similar age, education, and region of residence. Although these reshu­ ed
perceptions come from the same age-education group, they fail to exhibit statistical
signicance, supporting the notion that unobserved heterogeneity is not the source
of the results.
Moreover, we allow for the possibility of selection bias, measurement error and
functional form misspecication. For the rst of these three possibilities, we allow
respondents to jointly select their nancial circle and whether to invest in stocks
or not, but fail to nd any evidence for correlated unobserved factors in these two
decisions. For the second, we repeat the analysis exploiting individual responses
regarding the perceived population stock market participation rate and percentage
informed as an instrument for outer circle peer behavior and peer information, to
nd that the null hypothesis of no measurement error cannot be rejected. For the
third possibility, we allow for interaction terms between nancial and outer circle
perceived shares of informed and participating peers with expectations of returns,
and nd that the estimated interaction terms are never statistically di¤erent from
zero, while the estimated non-interacted terms remain present, remain statistically
signicant and similar in magnitude.
Last, we note that given the anonymous nature of stock holding and trading,
our analysis is not limited by the fact that we cannot trace the actual network
structure (De Paula, 2016) as this is an inherent feature of the stock market in view of
which stockholding behavior is determined. We elicit perceptions that respondents
have and on the basis of which they make stockholding choices, even though we
cannot observe the extent to which individual perceptions about peer information
or behavior correspond to their objective counterparts.
Our work relates to di¤erent strands of literature, from social interactions and
networks to nancial literacy. Within the growing literature examining peer and net-
work e¤ects on asset and debt behavior of households, such as Duo and Saez (2002,
2003), Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004), Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012), Georgarakos,
Haliassos and Pasini (2014), Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Milkman (2015),
Bailey, Cao, Kuchler and Stroebel (2016), Girshina, Mathae and Ziegelmeyer (2017),
Haliassos, Jansson and Karabulut (2018) or Ouimet and Tate (2017), we connect
8to the nancial literacy literature through the key role perceptions about returns
play as a measure of nancial knowledge (e.g. Lusardi, Michaud and Mitchell, 2016;
Campbell, 2016; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). Our work also relates to a fast growing
literature that examines the e¤ect of subjective expectations on individual economic
and nancial behavior, summarized by Hurd (2009) or more recently, by Greenwood
and Schleifer (2014), and its important consequences in the aggregate, as in e.g. Car-
roll (2003). More generally, Manski (2017) summarizes the progress and discusses
the promise of measurement of macroeconomic expectations. Other recent advances
in the literature include Bordalo, Gennaioli, Ma and Shleifer (2017), Fuster, Perez-
Truglia, Wiederholt and Zafar (2018) and Giustinelli and Shapiro (2018). Last, it is
also closely related to the literature on the e¤ects of social imitation and inuence
on nancial behavior in competitive markets within the larger literature on social
and information networks, see e.g. Jackson (2008).
Most related to our work is that of Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman and Yuchtman
(2014), who conduct a eld experiment in collaboration with a Brazilian broker-
age rm in order to disentangle endorsement from information peer e¤ects on the
willingness to invest in a brand new nancial product. For such a product, they
conclude that both motives are important in individual nancial decision making
and that the social learning channel is relatively more important than the social
utility channel amongst more sophisticated investors. Also related is the experi-
mental work by Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duo and Jackson (2013) who study a
newly introduced micro-nance program in rural India and conclude that most peer
e¤ects on the take-up rates of the program are due to an information channel. Al-
though the tight control of information ows in both these eld experiments helps
separate information from social e¤ects, it may articially magnify the importance
of each signal, possibly biasing upwards the estimate of information e¤ects relative
to what would have been observed for well-established nancial products (stocks)
in a mature nancial market, where investors may be informed through a multitude
of channels.7 Finally, recent empirical work by Ozsoylev, Walden, Yavuz and Bildik
(2014) attempts to identify an empirical (professional) investor network by assuming
that time proximity of transactions implies network connectivity between investors.
The similarities and di¤erences with these papers are further evaluated, in light of
our ndings, in Section 4.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical
framework and derives key predictions. Section 3 describes the survey design in
7The same observation is also made by Manski (2017): he argues that the exogenous provision
of a new nancial product or information about it assumes understanding of the underlying reasons
why individuals did not gather the information on their own.
9detail. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
Ozsoylev and Walden (2011) provide a microfoundation for an information network
e¤ect within a rational model of equilibrium asset pricing where prices and private
signals about asset returns transmit information. We extend their model to guide our
survey design and empirical strategy. In what follows, we present a brief overview of
the model, the generalization of their theorem and explain how the derived individual
asset demand function will be used as a guide for identifying information peer e¤ects.
There are two assets, one risky (stock) and one risk free (bond). The payo¤ of
the risk free asset is 1. The payo¤ of the risky asset follows a normal distribution
X  N( X;2) and its price is p. The supply of stocks is random and is given by
Zn = nZ, where Z  N( Z;2) and Z > 0.8 The nal wealth of the agent is
!i = !0i +Di (X   p) ; (1)
where !0i is the initial wealth of agent i. Agent i chooses Di units of the risky
asset to maximize expected utility from nal wealth, conditional on his information
set Ii. We assume constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences u (!i) =
 e i!i , where i is the absolute risk aversion of agent i. Agent i thus solves the
problem
max
Di
E [u (!i) j Ii] = max
Di
E f  exp [ i (!0i +Di (X   p))] j Iig : (2)
Therefore,
Di =
E [(X   p) jIi]
iV ar [XjIi]
: (3)
Every agent i receives a primary (agent specic) piece of information in the form of
a signal on the risky asset payo¤ yi = X + i, i  N(0; s2i ). We allow heterogeneity
across the variance of the signals of the agents, to reect the fact that agents may
have more or less precise information about the risky asset for exogenous reasons.
Agents may know each other socially and these links are captured by an adja-
cency matrix A, where the typical element aij can take value 1 or 0, if agents i and
j know each other or not, respectively. We allow for loops, i.e. we let aii = 1, for
all agents. Since aij = aji, the matrix A is symmetric. For an investor i, his/her
social circle is then dened by his network neighborhood, i.e. all investors j, such
that aij = 1.
8See Easley, OHara and Yang (2013) for discussion on positive supply of risky assets and liquidity
traders.
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To describe the nancial circle of an investor, we dene an additional adjacency
matrix G which describes the nancial network. Investors determine their demand
for the risky asset by pooling their own private information about its return, with
private signals of investors with whom they interact socially. An investor combines
his/her own signal with those of his/her neighbors to generate a payo¤ signal xi,
by averaging the signals of his/her social circle, weighted by their corresponding
precisions. In particular, the weight on the signal of investor j used by investor i, is
assumed to be the precision of the signal of agent j.9 From the perspective of agent
i, when pooling all the signals from his/her neighbors, he/she then puts more weight
on agents with more precise signals and less weight on those with less precision.10
The typical element of matrix G is then
gij = finformation is passed on from agent j to agent ig = aij
s2j
;
in other words, G = A 1, where  = diag

s21; :::; s
2
n
	
. We note that G represents
a weighted and directed network. The pooled payo¤ signal xi for agent i is:
xi =
P
k2Ri yk
di

Pn
k=1 gikykPn
k=1 gik
= X +
Pn
k=1 gikkPn
k=1 gik
: (4)
The assumption that the network is weighted by signal precision captures the fact
that investors put more importance on good quality information they receive from
the social circle. Given the information network, investors information sets are
dened by
Ii = fxi; pg;8i = 1; :::; n (5)
because also asset prices are allowed to transmit information in equilibrium, and
investors rationally anticipate it. We also assume that the random variables X; Z
and i are all jointly independent.
Next, let
ki =
nX
k=1
aik
s2k
(6)
be the connectedness of investor i. This is a generalization of the well known concept
of degree, or strength, which counts the number of links of a network node. Under
9We can also assume it to be the relative precision of the signal of agent j, i.e. the precision
of js signal over the precision of is signal. This is a more attractive assumption, but complicates
unnecessarily the mathematical expressions of the assumptions needed in deriving the optimal
demand function, without a¤ecting the formal expression of our econometric specication.
10Proportional weighting as a function of signal precisions typically obtains in models of Bayesian
learning from others, but also in recent models of contagion, e.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
(2016).
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a set of assumptions on the asymptotic nature of the network structure as the
number of investors n grows, we extend and generalize Theorem 1 of Ozsoylev and
Walden (2011). The set of assumptions and the precise statement of the Theorem
can be found in Appendix A. Broadly speaking, the assumptions require that the
information network is sparse, i.e. that the strength of connections between agents
is of the same order as the number of nodes, and that no agent is informationally
superior in the large nancial market (as n ! 1). The average connectedness 
of the economy-wide information network as the economy grows, is dened via the
assumption that
lim
n!1
1
n
nX
i=1
ki
i
=  + o (1) ;  <1
which imposes that the average risk-adjusted node strength is nite. Then, we show
that there exists a linear noisy rational expectations equilibrium as n ! 1, such
that with probability one the risky asset price converges to
p = 0 + 
 X    Z; (7)
where
0 = 

 X2 + Z2
2^2 + 2

;  =
2^2 + 2
2^2 + 2 + 22
;  = :
and ^ denotes the nite harmonic mean of risk aversions of all agents in the popu-
lation (see Assumption 3, in Appendix A).
In determining their optimal demand for the risky assets, agents form a sub-
jective expectation of the return on the asset, based on the average signal of their
social circle. In equilibrium, and as n!1, the expected return for an investor i is
given by
E (XjIi) = k

i 
22
ki 22 + 2 + 2
2xi +

22 + 2
ki 22 + 2 + 2
2

X; (8)
where ki = limn!1 ki. This suggests that larger connectedness k

i implies that
investors expectations react more strongly to their pooled signal. Moreover, in equi-
librium, the asymptotic demand for the risky asset by an agent i can be expressed
12
in the two following ways:
Di 
1
i

1
2
+ ki +
2
2

(E (XjIi)  p) (9)
or
Di =
^
i
 X2 + Z2
^22 + 2

  ^
i

2
2 (^2 + )

p+
ki
i
(xi   p) : (10)
Expressions (8)-(10) will guide our empirical investigation of informative social
interactions. Expression (9) suggests that there are two ways in which individual
connectedness ki is important for investors i demand for the risky asset: rst there
is an indirect e¤ect via the expected return, since ki a¤ects E (XjIi) in (8), and
second, a direct positive e¤ect of risk-adjusted connectedness ki =i appearing in the
rst parenthesis of (9). The former captures the higher relative weight attributed
to more/better informed peers when forming the expectation of a stock market
return, common in work on Bayesian learning from peers. The latter captures the
reduction in agentsposterior variance of expected returns obtained in equilibrium by
agents that are more and/or better connected, adjusted by the agents risk aversion.
The second expression (10) again decomposes potentially two channels via which
individual connectedness can a¤ect demand: directly, via the positive e¤ect of ki =i;
and indirectly through its e¤ect on the excess return (i.e. within xi).
Equilibrium asset prices and optimal demand for risky assets by individuals are
parametrized by a range of model characteristics. Here, our main focus is on two of
those, namely connectedness of individuals and risk attitudes, which we discuss in
turn. First, the model predicts that higher individual connectedness makes agents
more willing to invest in risky assets in response to good pooled signals. In addition,
higher individual connectedness ki may be the result of two e¤ects: (i) a larger
number of acquaintances (i.e. larger number of agents for which of aij 6= 0) and/or
(ii) higher signal precision of the signals that individual i pools from her/his social
interactions. Both e¤ects imply that the more informative ones social interactions
are (i.e. as the precision of an individuals pooled signals improves), the lower is the
posterior variance of returns and hence, the higher the fraction of wealth that the
agent is willing to place in the risky asset, in response to good signals. This is the
information e¤ect from informative social interactions that we seek to empirically
identify exploiting our survey data. Second, risk preferences matter for equilibrium
demand for information: a given connectedness (which measures how informed an
agent is) has more value when the agents risk aversion is lower, because less risk
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averse agents can expect to benet more from investing in the risky asset, as recently
uncovered by Cabrales, Gossner and Serrano (2013, 2017).11
We also highlight here that both the expressions for expected returns (8) and
equilibrium individual demands (9) - (10) only require knowledge about the economy-
wide average connectedness  and the individual connectedness of investors, ki , and
not the exact general structure of the network. This is a very important feature of
the theoretical framework for the design of our empirical strategy, because it allows
us to sidestep known issues that arise from not knowing the exact network structure
within a population. For our purposes, when designing the survey, a representative
sample from a large population for which we can identify measures for ki is su¢ cient
to empirically identify an information peer e¤ect and the three expressions (8)-(10)
will be the basis of our empirical design and specications.
3. Survey Design
In this section, we provide a brief description of the survey design and the specically
designed questions we exploit. More detailed information about both is provided
in Appendix B. The survey is part of an ongoing survey of the French population
administered by Taylor-Nelson Sofres (TNS). We design and exploit data from two
linked questionnaires that were elded in December 2014 and May 2015 respectively.
The rst questionnaire (2014 wave) contains questions that provide very detailed
information on risk attitudes, preferences, expectations and perceptions of stock
market returns, in addition to wealth, income and socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics for a representative sample of French households by age, wealth and
asset classes. The follow-up questionnaire (2015 wave) contains a variety of questions
that specically aim at gathering information about respondentssocial and nancial
circles. These include questions on of respondentsperceptions of how informed their
circles are with respect to the stock market and how heavily they participate in it, as
well as similar questions regarding their perceptions of overall population behavior,
in terms of information about and participation in the stock market. In addition,
respondents are asked to report their perceived relative standing vis-à-vis their peers
along a number of dimensions.
The 2014 questionnaire was sent to a representative sample of 4,000 individu-
als, corresponding to an equivalent number of households. Respondents had to ll
11Heterogeneity in risk preferences is what would drive trade in assets in this model were infor-
mation homogeneous across investors. Less risk averse investors would also be willing to pay more
for informative private signals, as recently shown by Cabrales et al. (2013). As a result, less risk
averse agents would be expected to have more/better informed connections, which creates the need
to extend Ozsoylev and Waldens (2011) theorem to heterogeneity in risk aversion before seeking
empirical validation of the models predictions.
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the questionnaire, and return it by post in exchange for e25 in shopping vouch-
ers (bons-dachat). Of those, 3,670 individuals returned completed questionnaires,
corresponding to a 92% response rate. The follow-up questionnaire in May 2015
was sent to the 2014 wave of 3,670 respondents, out of which we recovered a total
of 2,587 completed questionnaires, corresponding to a response rate of 70.5%. The
relevant questions that inform our empirical analysis can be grouped in four sets,
which we describe below.
First, we have questions that directly ask respondents to state what is their total
nancial wealth (excluding housing), and of this wealth, what share they invest in
the stock market (directly or indirectly). The latter denes variable %FW which
captures the demand for risky assets conditional on participating in the stock mar-
ket. From the same question, we generate the variable Pr(Stocks > 0) which takes
value 1 if respondents have a positive share of their nancial wealth invested in the
stock market and value 0 otherwise.
The second set of questions asks respondents to state their expectations and
perceptions about a public non-manipulable event (e.g. the expected return on a
buy-and-hold portfolio that tracks the evolution of the stock market index, CAC-40,
over a ve-year time window).12 The recent literature on measuring expectations
privileges the use of probability questions rather than eliciting point expectations
or the traditional qualitative approach of attitudinal research (Manski, 2004). An-
swers to such questions are then used for understanding whether expectations and
outcomes are related, and for evaluating whether individual behavior changes in re-
sponse to changes in expectations. Crucially, we also include questions that inquire
respondents about their perceptions regarding the most recent realization of an anal-
ogous measure (e.g. the most recent realized cumulative return on a buy-and-hold
portfolio that tracks the evolution of the stock market index over a three-year hori-
zon). The questions in this second set are designed with the following four goals in
mind. First, the use of ve years as a forecasting horizon helps untie expectational
answers from business cycle conditions prevailing at the time of elding the sur-
veys, to better capture the historic average upward trend of the stock market index,
and inertia in portfolio management (e.g. see Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos,
2010). The latter is important, since it remains an open question with what hori-
zon in mind households invest in the stock market. Second, probability densities
are elicited on seven points of the outcome space, instead of just two points of the
12Dominitz and Manski (2007) elicit probabilistically individualsexpectations of stock market
returns inquiring about how well the respondent thinks the economy will do in the year ahead.
They exploit data for a representative sample of the elderly from the 2004 wave of the U.S. Health
and Retirement Study (HRS).
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cumulative distribution functions, to obtain more precise individual estimates of
the relevant moments and of the uncertainty surrounding expectations.13 Third,
we exploit data from a representative sample by age (while for example, Dominitz
and Manski, 2007, report results only for the elderly). Fourth, probabilistic elici-
tation of the most recent cumulative stock market return over a three-year horizon
provides a quantitative measure of householdsdegree of awareness of stock market
developments, to capture di¤erences in information across households as well as the
relationship between information and expectations, as in Coibion, Gorodnichenko
and Kumar (2018).14 We use responses to questions C39 and C42 (from TNS2014)
to generate variables Expec: R and Perc: R respectively, which in turn are used
as proxies for expected conditional returns E (XjIi) and for perceptions of realized
returns (based on signals) xi.
The questionnaire contains a third set of questions that are designed to identify
the social circle of respondents and will be used for the empirical analysis. The aim
is generate meaningful proxies for the individual connectedness ki of each respon-
dent. A main novelty of the survey is to distinguish between a broad circle of social
acquaintances of respondents (social circle) and a smaller circle within it, dened
as the respondentsacquaintances with whom the respondents convene about nan-
cial matters (nancial circle). We separately identify both from responses to the
following survey questions respectively:
C1: Approximately how many people are there in your social circle of acquain-
tances?
D1: With how many people from your social circle (as identied in C1), do you
interact with regarding your own nancial/investment matters?
Of the 2,587 respondents that returned the TNS2015 questionnaires, about 90%
and 87% answered questions C1 and D1 respectively. The average number of people
in the respondents social circles and nancial circles is 52.5 and 3.1 people respec-
tively. About half of the valid responses for question D1 were zero, so we also report
that the average of the remaining half (i.e. not taking into account the zeros) is
approximately 5 people. This constitutes evidence in support of our theoretical
13This follows the methodology of the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) con-
ducted by the Bank of Italy, e.g. Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996).
14Also, Armantier, Nelson, Topa, Van der Klaauw and Zafar (2016) document substantial dif-
ferences across households regarding the most recent US ination rate. Afrouzi, Coibion, Gorod-
nichenko and Kumar, (2015) examine the relationship between ination expectations and percep-
tions of ination in a sample of CE/FOs of New Zealand rms.
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framework and predictions, which are only relevant under the assumption of suf-
cient network sparsity, i.e. the network is not too dense in terms of number of
links.
Question C1 is formulated with the network of social acquaintances in mind,
as described by adjacency matrix A in Section 2. For respondent i, the answer
to C1 provides an approximation of the respondents degree, dened by
Pn
j=1 aij .
Question D1 denes a subset of the people from the respondents social circle, and
is formulated in order to generate broadly a proxy for the elements of matrix G,
i.e. a statistic of whether information about the stock market is passed on from
acquaintance j to respondent i. Question D1 thus invites respondents to describe a
possibly smaller innercircle of peers with whom they discuss nancial matters (the
nancial circle), and to distinguish them from the outer circle of peers with whom
they interact socially without necessarily discussing nances. It leaves open the
possibility that the respondent does not have such an inner circle, and this choice is
modelled explicitly in the later part of our empirical analysis.
With reference to the theoretical model, respondents may be able to extract
information (signals) about the stock market from the members of their nancial
circle, i.e. we assume that (with normalized precision), if an acquaintance belongs in
the respondents nancial circle, then gij = aij . On the other hand, other acquain-
tances are excluded from the nancial circle, if their signal precision is 0, i.e. when
respondents state that they do not interact with them regarding nancial matters,
and in that case gij = 0. Characteristics of the social circle excluding the nancial
circle, namely the outer circle, can then be inferred (up to an allowable margin of
error) from responses regarding the overall social circle and the inner nancial circle.
Having dened the various peer circles, we elicit respondentspoint perceptions
about how many of their friends and acquaintances in the overall social circle and in
the nancial circle, are informed about the stock market, as well as their correspond-
ing perceptions about peers investing in the stock market.15 The exact wording of
the questions is:
15A similar question format has been successfully exploited by researchers at the Dutch National
Bank and at the University of Tilburg (CentER Panel) when identifying social interactions on
individual outcomes, since it helps in overcoming the reection problem identied by Manski (1993).
The reection problem refers to the impossibility of separately identifying the e¤ect of peerschoices
(endogenous or peer e¤ects) from the e¤ect of peerscharacteristics (contextual e¤ects) on individual
outcomes, when individual and peerschoices are made simultaneously and as a function of common
contextual factors. Here, instead of considering peersactual choices, we exploit the variation in
individual perceptions about peerschoices (e.g. stockholding status), which when combined with
individual perceptions about peerscharacteristics (e.g. peersinformation or respondentsrelative
standing in terms of education, wealth or professional status), enables identication. See Blume et
al. (2011, 2015) for additional details.
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C7i/D16i: In your opinion, what is the proportion of people in your social/nancial
circle that invests in the stock market? (as a %)
C7ii/D16ii: In your opinion, what is the proportion of people in your social/nancial
circle that follows the stock market? (as a %)
Of the 2,587 respondents that send back the TNS2015 questionnaires, about 96%
and 88% of respondents provided valid answers for questions C7 and D16 respec-
tively.16 The cross-sectional average point estimates for the perceived percentage of
the social and nancial circle that invests in the stock market is 10.7% and 18.9%
respectively. Also, the cross-sectional average point estimates for the perceived per-
centages of the social and the nancial circles that follows the stock market are 12.6%
and 20.5% respectively. These questions dene directly variables %SC Particip:,
%FC Particip, %SC Inform: and %FC Inform: The perceived percentage of the
outer circle of a respondent that invests in or is informed about the stock market is
obtained from
%OC Particip:  C1 C7i D1D16i
C1 D1 ; (11)
%OC Inform:  C1 C7ii D1D16ii
C1 D1 : (12)
Additionally and similarly, questions C6i and C6ii ask respondents about the propor-
tion of the French population that invest and are informed about the stock market,
respectively.17 Surprisingly, the cross-sectional average point estimate for the pro-
portion of the French population investing in the stock market is remarkably close
to the cross-sectional mean participation rate in our representative sample: 19.4
percent versus 21.7 percent, respectively.
The nal set of questions ask respondents to place themselves relative to others
in their circles, both social and nancial. With these, respondents state how the see
themselves in terms of wealth, education and professional standing relative to their
peers (for details see Appendix B4).
For notational convenience we use the abbreviations SC, FC, OC for the social
circle (dened by C1), nancial circle (dened by D1) and outer circle (dened as
16 In answering each of the questions, the respondent was also given the option to tick the box
I do not know. About 64% and 61% chose this option for questions C7i and D16i respectively.
About 61% and 58% reported this option for questions C7ii and D16ii, respectively.
17 In answering each of the questions, the respondent was also given the option to tick the box I
do not know,(DK). About 54% and 52% chose this option for questions C6i and C6ii respectively.
About 3.1% chose not to answer these questions, and are accordingly coded as non-responses,
(NR).
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answer to C1 - answer to D1) respectively. Other abbreviations used throughout
the paper are summarized in Table 1. Denitions, exact question statements and
detailed explanations on the variables and the survey questions can be found later in
the paper and in Appendix B. Table 7 provides summary statistics for the variables
we use in the analysis.
4. Empirical analysis
Consistent with our theoretical analysis, in which equilibrium depends on the con-
nectedness, ki , rather than on the precise identity of interacting agents, we employ
measures of such connectedness in our empirical analysis. Specically, we focus
on whether and how expectations, perceptions, and behavior are inuenced by the
share of the relevant peer circle that the respondent considers informed about or
participating in the stock market.
4.1. Putting the social and nancial circles into context. Our assumption
in the theoretical model is that respondents meet their peers and weight the infor-
mation they obtain from them according to how reliable they perceive their peers
to be. In real life, it is natural to think of respondents as forming a nancial circle,
in the sense of a subset of their overall social circle with whom they feel condent
to discuss nancial matters. Respondents are indeed asked whether they have such
a nancial circle, as well as their perceptions regarding attributes of their social
circle and their nancial circle, and they separately report their perceptions as to
the shares of both circles that are (i) informed about and (ii) participating in the
stock market. It is important to stress that our data do not record actual shares of
informed or participating peers, which may or may not be known to respondents,
but shares as they are perceived by respondents who form expectations and decide
on own stock market participation and exposure.
For respondents who declare having formed a nancial circle, we use expressions
(11) and (12) to compute their implied perceptions regarding members of their social
circle with whom they do not discuss nances. The distinction between a nancial
and an outer circle is very useful for checking whether our results might be caused
by unobserved heterogeneity rather than peer inuences; and in distinguishing be-
tween exchange of information and mindless imitation of stockholding behavior.
Specically, it is possible that there are unobserved factors inuencing the respon-
dents stock market expectations, perceptions or behavior, as well as whether their
peers are informed about, or participating in the stock market. These unobserved
factors might induce a correlation between responses and peer attributes without
implying any e¤ect from peers on respondents. If respondent stock market expec-
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tations, perceptions, or behavior reect simply unobserved dimensions along which
respondents are similar to their peers, we would expect correlations to be present,
whether we consider the nancial circle or the outer social circle not privy to nan-
cial matters. If, however, only the nancial circle, but not the outer circle matters
for subjective expectations, perceptions, or behavior related to stockholding, then
this is evidence against unobserved heterogeneity creating the empirically observed
relationship. Furthermore, the within-respondent variation in peer groups that we
exploit is conditional on variation across respondents in population-wide market
outcomes, to guard against the possibility of social circle selection and unobserved
correlated e¤ects driving our peer e¤ect results, within a highly volatile, e¢ cient
and competitive market environment.
The split between a nancial and an outer circle can also shed some light on
whether social interactions take the form of mindless imitation or exchange of infor-
mation and possibly mindful imitation of peers perceived as knowledgeable about the
stock market. As an example, we would not expect the behavior of the outer circle,
with whom respondents do not discuss nancial matters, to inuence respondents
stockholding behavior directly unless there is pure imitation without the exchange
of information. On the other hand, interactions with the nancial circle can be in-
formative and contribute to a revision of perceptions about the past performance of
the stock market, expectations about the future, or choices regarding stockholding.
We also note here that the survey questions elicit the shares of informed and
participating peers in the nancial and overall social circles only. We use these two
responses to construct the corresponding share of peers in the outer circle, i.e., the
complement of the nancial circle to the overall social circle. As our approach is
indirect, it can sometimes lead to outer-circle shares that fall below zero or exceed
100%. When this happens, we adopt a conservative approach to potential inconsis-
tency: we set both the direct response on the nancial circle and the implied for
the outer circle to missing observation, and we introduce an inconsistency dummy
variable (IC) to ag such observations.18 All reported estimates on the two circles
explicitly control for observed inconsistencies in responses.
4.2. Expectations and perceptions. Existing empirical studies of peer e¤ects
on nancial behavior focus on outcomes, such as stockholding, retirement saving, or
debt outstanding. We begin our analysis by investigating the role of social interac-
tions for the formation of subjective return expectations about the future, as well
18Exception is made of those inconsistencies that are attributed to rounding, because of low
numbers reported to question D1. With this criterion in place, a total of 19 observations are
excluded from the IC category.
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as of perceptions regarding past stock market performance. As established, expec-
tations are an important determinant of the demand for risky assets, this analysis
is interesting both in its own right and as a component of the link to stockholding
behavior.19
To investigate the empirical relevance of perceptions regarding interacting peers
for subjective expectations of stock market returns over the next ve-year period,
we consider an approximate linear version of expression (8), which suggests two
empirical specications:
Expec: Ri = 0 + 1k

i +  i+ ei (13)
and
Expec: Ri = 0 + 1D
e
i +  i+ ei; (14)
where ki is an indicator of connectedness to the peer circle, D
e
i is an indicator
of expectedor perceived peer behavior (participation in the stock market),  i is
a vector of individual characteristics which includes individual perceptions about
peer characteristics, ei is an individual zero-mean error term distributed normally
conditional on covariates and the same coe¢ cient symbols are used for notational
economy but not to imply equality of coe¢ cients.20
Implementing either specication might raise concerns regarding the role of un-
observed heterogeneity. Unobserved factors a¤ecting all peers, including the respon-
dent, could be creating a tendency for peers to be perceived as informed about the
stock market (or as participating in the stock market), and simultaneously for the
respondent to be having higher or lower expectations about future stock market
returns. This could induce a relationship between the share of the social circle be-
ing informed and the reported subjective expectation without any causal implication
running from perceived peer information (participation) to respondent expectations.
As a rst approach to handling this problem, we distinguish perceptions about
the two peer circles: the inner, nancial circle with whom respondents report that
19Standard models of nancial choice under uncertainty predict that decisions should be based on
expectations of future aggregate market outcomes, and not on publicly available information about
recent market outcomes, since the latter should be incorporated into respondentsexpectations upon
conditioning (Brandt, 2010). Indeed, a recent strand of empirical literature nds that subjective
expectations are signicantly related to nancial decisions (e.g. Dominitz and Manski, 2007; Kezdi
and Willis, 2009; Hurd et al., 2011).
20To control for endorsement peer e¤ects that can rationalize mindless imitation (e.g. due to
a preference to conform), we include measures of the respondents perceived relative standing in
terms of average peer education, average total wealth and professional status with respect to the
social and nancial circles.
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they discuss nancial matters; and the rest of their social circle with whom they
report that they do not discuss such matters. Moreover, we also control for indi-
vidual perceptions of market-wide characteristics unrelated to peer behavior, but
that might be driving asset prices, like an increase in the proportion of the overall
population investing in or being informed about the stock market.
We then investigate whether either share is signicantly related to the respon-
dents subjective expectation about future stock market returns, after controlling for
a range of observable respondent characteristics. By splitting the social circle into a
nancial circle and an outer circle, we are able to apply a double circlemethodology
to identication. Additionally, by including in the controls respondentsperceptions
about population-level behavior, we introduce a novel triple circlemethodology,
with which we explicitly control for both selection of the social circle within the
overall population and for the possibility of correlated, unobserved e¤ects.21 If
unobserved heterogeneity is an important problem, then it should a¤ect both the
nancial circle and the outer social circle. Thus, nding di¤erent results for the
inner and the outer circles, conditioning on population behavior suggests that the
di¤erence is not due to unobserved heterogeneity, because such heterogeneity would
necessarily have a signicant e¤ect on both circles. The empirically implemented
specications are:
Expec: Ri = 0 + 1;FCk

i;FC + 1;OCk

i;OC + 1;Pk

i;Pop + e i+ ei;
and
Expec: Ri = 0 + 1;FCD
e
i;FC + 1;OCD
e
i;OC + 1;PD
e
i;Pop + e i+ ei:
We are able to control for a wide range of characteristics and attitudes of the house-
hold head, e i. These include individual perceptions about the respondents relative
standing in terms of peer characteristics (professional status, education and total
wealth), demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, number of chil-
dren), elicited risk preferences (coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion), a proxy for in-
dividual information (self-reported individual perception of the most recent realized
stock market cumulative return), proxies for resources and constraints (educational
attainment, employment status, assets, income, perceived borrowing constraints,
21Our triple-circlemethodology separately identies the e¤ects of the inner, the outer, and the
population-minus-social circle outcomes and characteristics on individual behaviour. The necessity
of this approach arises from our interest in peer behavior within a competitive market environment.
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Figure 1: French stock market index, CAC 40, weekly data, 3 March 1990 - 27 June
2016. Source: Yahoo Finance.
and achieved liquid saving over the past year), and region of residence.22 In all
specications, we also include dummies for item non-response and inconsistent re-
sponses, especially to the questions about perceived peer and population behavior.23
Despite the fact that all respondents were asked about the same stock mar-
ket, there is considerable heterogeneity in responses, in both perceptions about its
evolution prior to the data collection and subjective expectations regarding future
stock returns. Figure 1 shows historical monthly data of the French stock market
index CAC-40, from March 1990 to June 2016. The index dropped by nearly 25%
at the time of the sovereign-debt crisis during the second half of 2011. After that
and as we get closer to the time that the two parts of the survey were elded, the
stock market index was steadily recovering. Both in late December 2014 and May
2015, the index was still below its dot-com and the Lehman brothers peaks, but had
already recovered relative to the sovereign-debt crisis. Given the substantial tur-
moil experienced by the stock market index over the period prior to data collection,
respondents are likely to have been exposed to considerable news coverage of the
stock market evolution, and this makes the observed variation in perceptions and
expectations all the more striking.
The actual stock market return over the three-year period in question (Dec 2011
22Detailed variable denitions are to be found in Appendix B.
23Controlling for item non response to those questions hardly a¤ects the sign, size, and signicance
of the main coe¢ cients of interest, namely on perceptions regarding peers. A similar robustness
exercise in the presence of missing data can be found in Dimmock, et. al. (2016).
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- Dec 2014) was +34:57%, but the cross-sectional average perception of respondents
regarding returns over the same period is equal to +3:6%. Figure 2 shows the actual
3-year returns from July 2014 to the June 2015. The average actual 3-year return
in the second half of 2014 was +34:49%. Figure 2 also shows the annualized 3-year
returns for the same period, which are still well above the average perceived returns,
at an average value of 12.43%. Although this average perception gap in stock market
returns seems too wide, it is consistent with rational inattention (Sims, 2003) and is
in line with reported empirical ndings on the ination perception gap of households
(Jonung, 1981; Armentier et al. 2016) and CE/FOs of rms (Coibion, et. al., 2018).
The average cross-sectional subjective expectation of respondents regarding fu-
ture returns is equal to +1:6%. Positive deviations of perceptions from the low
cross-sectional mean and optimism that is greater than the average observed among
respondents of given characteristics in the sample seem consistent with the respon-
dent having more informed perceptions and expectations more in line with available
historical evidence.24
Table 2 reports estimates from these two specications for subjective expected
returns. The regression specication in column (1) includes, in addition to the
usual household controls, respondent perceptions regarding how informed members
of the two peer circles are. It can be seen that the share of the nancial circle
that the respondent regards as informed about the stock market is positively and
signicantly related to the respondents subjective expectation of future return. The
relationship is quantitatively signicant: a one-standard-deviation increase of 17.2
percent in the mean share of a respondents nancial circle that is informed about the
stock market increases the mean expected return by approximately +0.5 percentage
points (or about a 30% increase relative to the unconditional mean expected return
of +1.6 percentage points). By contrast, the corresponding share of the outer circle
is found to be statistically insignicant. Similarly, for the share of the population
informed. This di¤erence in results suggests that the observed signicant correlation
is not simply due to unobserved heterogeneity and creates a presumption in favor
of a causal e¤ect from the nancial circle that we will subject to further scrutiny
below.
24Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2008) report a historical (arithmetic) mean excess return (risk
premium) in France for 1900-2005 of around 6% (per annum, p.a), but that gure was revised
downwards by Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010) to 2% p.a. when examining a longer time window
(1870-2007), correctly weighting for stock market capitalization and adjusting for survivorship bias.
Since we are asking respondents about the expected return over a ve-year horizon, to be consistent
with the estimate by Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010) the cross-sectional mean should be 2% p.a. times
5 years, or around 10% which is almost an order of magnitude larger than the cross-sectional mean
expected return of 1.6%.
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Figure 2: French stock market CAC 40, three-year stock market returns, weekly
data, July 2014 to June 2015. The blue bars show cumulative 3-year returns and
in particular, the red segment shows the actual cumulative 3-year return at the
time that the survey was elded, Dec 2014. The green dashed line shows the actual
annualized 3-year returns and the black dashed line indicates the perceived 3-year
return at the time that the survey was elded.
The specication in column (2) focuses on the shares of the nancial and of
the outer circle that the respondent perceives as participating in the stock market.
Again, we nd that the share of stockholders in the nancial circle has a positive,
quantitatively and statistically signicant e¤ect on subjective expected stock market
returns, while the corresponding share in the outer circle (or of the population)
does not: a one standard deviation increase in the mean share of the respondents
nancial circle that invests in the stock market increases the mean expected return
by approximately +0.4 of a percentage point, representing about a 24% increase
relative to the unconditional mean expected return.
Beyond their econometric motivation, the di¤erent ndings for the two circles
also have implications for the likely role of information, rather than mindless im-
itation, in the interactions among peers. First, and in both specications, it is
perceptions about the nancial and not the outer circle that are related to subjec-
tive expectations. This is the circle with which respondents discuss nancial matters
and with which information exchange rather than mere observation of behavior is
most likely to occur. Second, both perceived attributes of the nancial circle that
were found to be signicant are likely to generate information for the respondent:
the share of the nancial circle being informed and the share holding stocks and
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thus knowledgeable about them. The information and participation patterns of the
outer social circle, not deemed reliable for discussion of nancial matters, are not
related to stock market expectations of respondents.
In line with the recent literature on ination expectations by households (Ar-
mentier et al., 2016) and rms (Coibion et al., 2018), columns (3) to (5) of Table
2 introduce subjective perceptions of recent stock price growth (over the past three
years) in the regression of subjective stock market return expectations.25 Answers
to question C42 in our survey enable probabilistic elicitation of respondentspercep-
tions about the most recent realized cumulative stock market return over a three-year
period.26 We focus on the mean of each respondents subjective probability distribu-
tion over the size of the realized three-year stock market return. For brevity, we will
be referring to this as the respondents perceived return, with the previously intro-
duced notation Perc:R. Consistent with results reported in the literature on ina-
tion expectations, we nd that perceived returns are strongly statistically signicant
in the subjective expectations regressions, controlling for respondent characteristics
and perceptions about peer characteristics, regardless of whether peer variables are
included in the regression or not. Strikingly, neither the share of informed peers
nor the share of stockholders in the peer circle retain their statistical signicance in
the presence of subjective perceptions regarding the recent past return. This nding
suggests that respondent perceptions regarding how informed their nancial circle is
or how extensively its members participate in the stock market inuence subjective
expectations of future returns only to the extent that they inuence perceptions of
recent past returns.
Next, we examine how perceived returns Rit are associated with perceptions
about peer information, ki ; or group stockholding behavior, D
e
i ; as follows:
27
Rit = Perc: R = 0 + 1;FCk

i;FC + 1;OCk

i;OC + 1;Pk

i;Pop + vi + %i; (15)
or
Rit = Perc: R = 0 + 1;FCD
e
i;FC + 1;OCD
e
i;OC + 1;PD
e
i;Pop + vi + %i; (16)
25Measuring individual information sets is di¢ cult even in experimental settings, but some
progress has been made by extending Manskis (2004) probabilistic elicitation techniques to facts (as
opposed to events), as in Arrondel, Calvo-Pardo and Tas (2014), Afrouzi, Coibion, Gorodnichenko
and Kumar (2016) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Kumar (2018).
26The exact wording of the question, details about the construction of the variable as well as
summary statistics can be found in Appendix B.
27This is also in the spirit of Banerjee et al. (2013) or Bursztyn et al. (2014).
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where %i is an individual zero-mean error term distributed normally conditional
on covariates, vi is a vector of individual characteristics, including individual per-
ceptions about the respondents relative standing in terms of peer characteristics
(professional status, education and total wealth), and we use the same symbols for
coe¢ cients only for economy of notation and not to indicate equality across spec-
ications. We report estimates in columns (6) and (7) of Table 2. Interestingly,
we nd that perceived past returns are related to the perceived share of nancial
circle peers who are informed or who participate in the stock market, but not to the
corresponding features of the outer circle. Quantitatively, a one standard deviation
increase in the mean share of the respondents nancial circle informed increases the
mean perceived return by around 1.0 percentage point, representing about a 27%
increase relative to the unconditional mean. The respective numbers for participat-
ing in the stock market are 0.8 percentage points, representing approximately a 23%
increase relative to the unconditional mean. This is consistent with our ndings in
the expectations regressions that did not control for perceived returns and with the
introduction of such controls rendering the peer circles insignicant.
All in all, results in Table 2 paint a consistent picture: any inuence of peers on
subjective return expectations operates through altering perceptions of past returns.
The nding that only the nancial and not the outer social circle are related to
perceptions of past returns also suggests that the observed relationship is unlikely
to arise from unobserved heterogeneity, a conclusion that we will return to in what
follows. The identied e¤ects are conditional on relative standing measures of peer
characteristics, none of which are statistically signicant. This is consistent with
the view that mindless imitation does not a¤ect expectations of returns.
This rst set of results is strongly consistent with the presence of an informa-
tion channel in peer inuences running only through the nancial circle and only
through perceptions of what happened in the recent past. It also points to a novel
role for friends and acquaintances in enabling respondents to process factual infor-
mation about past stock market outcomes beyond ndings in the literature on the
importance of own cognitive ability and nancial knowledge for nancial behavior.28
4.3. Stockholding. Our preceding analysis of subjective stock market expecta-
tions above has conrmed our models prediction (common to models of Bayesian
learning from peers) that connectedness to people more knowledgeable about the
stock market receives a higher weight when forming expectations about stock mar-
ket returns. In addition, more knowledgeable connections raise the reported mean
28See, for example, Christelis, Jappeli and Padula (2010), Grinblatt, Keloharju and Ikäheimo
(2011) or Hurd, Van Rooij and Winter (2011).
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expected return, bringing it closer to available long-run historical estimates (e.g.
Dimson et al., 2008; Le-Bris and Hautcoeur, 2010). Since expected returns are
positively related to desired portfolio exposure to stocks, this alone would su¢ ce
to create a role for social interactions in stockholding decisions. In this section,
however, we examine our second prediction, i.e. whether social interactions and
connectedness reduce the posterior variance of returns and thereby increase the
prevalence of stockholding and the degree of exposure to stockholding risk, beyond
its indirect e¤ect through stock market expectations.
Our starting point is the demand for investing in the stock market in expressions
(9) and (10). Reorganizing this indicates that the risk-adjusted individual demands
depend on a term that is common to all agents and a term that is individual-
specic. Since we are exploiting empirically the variation across agents, a linear
approximation of (9) suggests the following econometric specication for agent is
share of nancial wealth invested in the stock market:
Di = %FWi = maxf0; 0 + 1
(+)
ki + 2
(+)
Expec Ri + 3
( )
i +  i+ uig; (17)
where ui is an individual-specic error term. The vector  i contains individual
characteristics for respondent i, like age, gender, marital status, number of children,
geographical region of residence, employment status, assets, income, borrowing or
liquid savings. It also includes individual perceptions about the respondents rela-
tive standing in terms of peer characteristics for both the respondents social (profes-
sional status) and nancial circles (professional status, education and total wealth)
to capture conformity-driven peer e¤ects on nancial behavior.29 In addition, in-
dividual perceptions about population behavior/information are also included as
observable controls for social circle selection e¤ects, as well as for correlated e¤ects
due to aggregate events such as a news shockor a market trend. The signs un-
der the constant coe¢ cients indicate the theoretically predicted signs: more/better
informed connections reduce the equilibrium posterior variance of expected returns
(coe¢ cient 1), a higher expected net excess return (coe¢ cient 2) and lower risk
aversion (coe¢ cient 3) increase the desired fraction of nancial wealth to be in-
vested in the stock market, controlling for individual characteristics.
The zero term within the specication allows for the observed prevalence of
non-stockholders in the population. The empirical literature on stockholding has
dealt with stock market non-participation in two ways. One way is discrete choice
estimation (typically probit and less frequently logit regressions) of the decision
29The detailed denitions of these can be found in Appendix B.
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whether to hold stocks or not. Non-participation arises when the expected benet
from participation, which is a function of desired stockholding and the expected
equity premium, does not exceed the participation cost. A second type of empirical
approach invokes tobit estimation of the risky portfolio share. This is typically linked
to the portfolio model by considering that an agent can have a desired portfolio share
that is positive or negative, but the latter is restricted to zero through a constraint
preventing short sales of stock. This o¤ers a possibility to examine the households
degree of exposure to stockholding risk, as opposed to focusing only on its presence.30
Note that, in both cases, portfolio demand, stock market expectations, and stock
market perceptions play a potentially important role.
By analogy to our analysis of expectations and perceptions above, we also con-
sider another specication involving behavior among peers. This takes the form:
Di = %FW = maxf0; 0 + 1Dei + 2
(+)
Expec Ri + 3
( )
i +  i + wig; (18)
where Dei represents a feature of the respondents social circle, in this case the
extent of peer participation in the stock market, as perceived by the respondent. In
specication (17) we focus on respondentsperceptions about how informed their
nancial and outer circles are about the stock market; and in (18) we use their
perceptions regarding stock market participation of the two circles, all of which are
identied relative to the average population information about and participation in
the stock market, as perceived by the individual.
Stock Market Participation. Column (1) of Table 3 presents results for
a participation probit that employs responses on how informed the three circles
are perceived to be. We conrm that subjective expected returns are positively
and signicantly related to participation, consistent with existing portfolio models,
even after controlling for a number of household characteristics and for its declared
willingness to take risks, formulated as absolute risk aversion. Interestingly, however,
we nd that a one standard deviation increase in the mean share of a respondents
nancial circle that is informed about the stock market increases the probability of
investing in stocks by 7.4 percentage points, representing about a 34% increase in the
unconditional probability. This provides empirical support for our second prediction,
i.e. that having more/better informed connections reduces the equilibrium posterior
variance of stock returns. However this is not true for either the outer circle or the
30This standard approach should be interpreted with some caution, as it reduces stock market
non-participants to frustrated short-sellers of stock. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the use of
an estimator for censored data such as tobit and opens up possibilities for studying the extensive
margin.
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population average information.
Column (2) repeats the exercise but now uses respondent perceptions as to the
prevalence of stock market participation in the nancial and outer circles, as well as
in the overall population. Here the potential for imitation of stock market partici-
pation among peers is clearly present. Imitation of a person whom the respondent
considers worthy of discussing nancial matters is likely to be mindful imitation. It
might even not be imitation at all, if the respondent is not inuenced by the mere
fact that the members of the nancial circle participate in the stock market, but by
the information they are able to provide because they do participate.
However, we also nd that stock market participation among the outer circle
has a positive and statistically signicant relationship to the respondents own de-
cision to hold stocks relative to the perceived overall population participation rate.
Further, from comparing both, we nd that a one-standard-deviation increase in
the mean share of the respondents nancial circle investing in the stock market
increases the probability to invest in stocks by around 6.3 percentage points, repre-
senting about a 30% increase relative to the sample mean proportion of stockholders
of 21.7%; for the outer circle, the respective numbers are an increase in the probabil-
ity to invest in stocks by 4 percentage points, representing a 19.5% increase relative
to the sample mean proportion of stockholders. The nding that respondents are
inuenced by the participation of people in their social circle with whom they do
not discuss nancial matters indicates that a tendency for conformism and mindless
imitation as regards stock market participation cannot be ruled out.
Columns (3) and (4) pursue further the econometric problem of potential unob-
served heterogeneity creating the observed correlations. In both cases, it is possible
that the observed relationships arise from unobserved factors that inuence both
the respondent and the respondents peers. Splitting the social circle into nan-
cial and outer circles already provides evidence against unobserved heterogeneity,
but now we have in column (2) a case in which we observe the joint signicance of
both circles. Although the population-wide e¤ect is not statistically signicant, in
columns (3) and (4), we undertake a placebo test of the hypothesis that the sta-
tistical signicance of the peer variables arises from a tendency for members of the
same age and education group living in the same region to behave in the same way
due to unobserved group factors. To this end, we reshu­ e the responses regard-
ing how informed the two circles are and how heavily they participate in the stock
market, respectively. We nd that, when each respondent is matched not with his
or her own responses regarding the nancial and outer circles, but with those of a
random person in the same age and education group and living in the same area,
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the coe¢ cients on both circles are no longer statistically signicant. This supports
the view that the observed correlations in columns (1) and (2) do not arise from
unobserved group factors that a¤ect all members of the same age and education
group who reside in the same area, including the respondent.
Conditional portfolio shares. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 adopt a to-
bit specication in order to test for peer inuences on the size of the exposure to
stockholding risk in the portfolio, conditional on holding stocks. Symmetrically to
columns (1) and (2), columns (5) and (6) examine the role of perceptions regarding
how informed the two circles are and to what extent they participate in the stock
market, relative to perceptions about the population. Here, the result is the same,
regardless of which feature of the peer circle we consider: higher shares of informed
or participating members of the nancial circle are related to greater exposure to
stockholding risk, providing support for the main theoretical prediction. But so does
the share of the outer circle investing in the stockmarket, which now accounts for
about a half of the overall peer e¤ect on the share of wealth invested in the stock-
market: a one-standard-deviation increase in the mean share of the respondents
nancial circle investing in the stock market, is related to a higher conditional share
of nancial wealth invested in the stock market by around 1 percentage point, repre-
senting about a 4.3% increase relative to the sample mean share of 21.41% amongst
stockholders. For the outer circle, the corresponding gure is a higher conditional
share invested by 1.4 percentage points, representing a 6.4% increase relative to the
sample mean. Just as above, we identify nancial and outer circle peer e¤ects of
perceptions relative to how respondents perceive the overall population, as a guard
against unobserved social group e¤ects. Columns (7) and (8) support the argu-
ment that the e¤ects identied on the intensive stockholding margin are not due to
unobserved group heterogeneity, by repeating the analogue placebo counterfactual
exercises as reported under columns (3) and (4) for the participation decision. We
also note that the e¤ects on the conditional share are net of the identied peer e¤ects
on subjective expectations.
All in all, the results in Table 4 suggest that exchange of useful information and
possibly mindful imitation are strongly related to whether individuals participate in
the stock market and to the share of nancial wealth invested in the stock market,
conditional on participating; yet, we also nd some evidence of mindless imitation
of the outer circle.
Robustness. So far, we have subjected our ndings of a relationship between
peer information/peer participation and respondent behavior to the scrutiny of dis-
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tinguishing between the inner (nancial) circle and the outer social circle, as well as
of running placebo tests as ways to handle unobserved heterogeneity. In this section
we provide some additional robustness checks in support of our ndings.
First, we examine robustness of our results to recognizing that respondents have
a choice of whether to form a nancial circle or not, and that this choice may
be taken jointly with the decision regarding stockholding. Specically, it may be
that people have some unobserved reason to hold stocks and this factor also pushes
them to form a nancial circle with whom they can discuss stockholding and other
nancial matters. This joint decision could induce the observed correlation between
stockholding and nancial sector attributes without any implication of causality
from the nancial circle to the respondents stockholding behavior. To deal with
this issue, we follow Blume et al. (2011) and we treat group choice and behavior
(within a group) as a set of joint outcomes.31 Specically, we consider a bivariate
probit model for the choice to participate in the stock market and the choice to
form a nancial circle, allowing for correlated unobserved factors inuencing the
two choices.32 We estimate the following bivariate probit econometric specication:(
Pr(Stocksi > 0) = (0 + 1k

iFC + 2k

iOC + 3k

iPop + 4Expec Ri + 5i +  i)
Pr(FCi > 0) = (
0
1k

iSC + 
0
2k

iPop + 
0
3Expec Ri + 
0
4i +  i
0)
(19)
and the corresponding one for peer participation in stockholding as opposed to the
share of informed peers, where we replace k with De. The stockholding participa-
tion probit is modeled as in previous sections. For the probit describing whether
the respondent decides to form a nancial circle as a subset of the social circle, we
postulate a set of explanatory variables that include the respondents observable
characteristics, the elicited degree of absolute risk aversion, subjective expectations
regarding stock market returns, subjective perceptions about the relative standing
of the respondentprofessional status relative to the mean professional status of the
overall circle, and subjective perceptions about the share of members of the overall
social circle that is informed about the stock market as well as the share that is
participating in the stock market.
31The standard approach in the literature has been to instrument peer nancial behavior; e.g.
Brown, Ivkovic, Smith and Weisbenner (2008) use the one-year-lagged average equity ownership
of nonnative community membersbirth states for equity ownership within the community, when
exploiting the variation across Metropolitan Statistical Areas which dene communities. Here, we
take the view by Blume et al. (2011) according to which self-selection contains information about
the respondents preferences, "which will depend on the social interactions that occur in groups over
which he is choosing". (p.880)
32Note that a two-step process, with nancial circle formation as the rst step, would run into
the di¢ culty that having a nancial circle is not a prerequisite for holding stocks. Indeed, our data
include stockholders who do not declare having a nancial circle.
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In principle the more being in the nancial circle and discussing nancial matters
with the respondent has to do with exchanging information rather than engaging in
mindless imitation, the more we would expect respondents to form a nancial circle
when they perceive a larger share of informed peers. Moreover, we would not expect
this decision to be inuenced by the share of people they perceive as candidates for
imitation.
Table 4 presents four bivariate probits. Odd-numbered columns correspond to
the stock market participation branches of the corresponding bivariate probits, while
even-numbered columns are the branches depicting the choice of whether to form
a nancial circle or not. In regressions (1) and (3), the share of the social circle
participating enters the regression for whether the respondent has a nancial circle
or not, while the share of the nancial circle participating enters the second leg of
the stock market participation decision. In regressions (2) and (4), the share of
the social circle perceived to be informed about the stock market plays this role,
with the corresponding share of the nancial circle participating entering the stock
market participation leg.
The stock market participation results under columns (1) and (3) conrm the
results we obtained earlier, even when we now also allow for a unobserved correlation
in the two decisions: subjective expected returns are positively correlated with stock
market participation, and so are the perceived shares of informed members in the -
nancial circle, as well as of the participating members in the nancial or outer circles.
The estimates for the corresponding second branches provide additional support for
the presence of informative social interactions: the share of informed members of
the social circle is statistically signicant for the choice to form a nancial circle,
but the share of participating members is not.
Moreover, Table 4 sheds light on the main concern leading to the bivariate probit
specication, namely that respondents who intend to invest in the stock market
choose, within their social circles, the peers with whom to discuss their own nancial
matters. In that case, the error terms ui and iFC would be highly correlated such
that ui = iFC + i; and the results reported in previous tables would be biased
due to selection. The last three rows in Table 4 report such correlations  and
the Wald test statistics and associated p-values for di¤erent specications of (19)
considered, and in no case can we reject the null of independence, H0 :  = 0: In
addition, estimated coe¢ cients on the peer variables and on other covariates under
columns (1) and (3) tend to be similar to those in Table 3.
The robustness of our ndings to explicit consideration of the joint decision to
have a nancial circle and to hold stocks may admit an intuitive interpretation, also
33
in light of Blume et al. (2011, 2015): by conditioning on the share of peers informed
or participating with whom the respondent does not exchange on own nancial
matters (i.e. on the outer social circle information or behavior), we are implicitly
controlling for the possibility of selection into the nancial circle in specications
considered in previous sections.33
Another possibility is that the information or behavior of those peers with whom
the respondent does not exchange on her/his own nancial decisions (outer circle) is
measured with error. If that were the case, the results reported in Table 2 would be
subject to attenuation bias and the e¤ect of the participation or information of the
outer circle on the individuals behavior would be biased towards zero. To account
for this possibility, we exploit responses of individuals regarding population partici-
pation in and information about the stock market and treat them as an instrument.
This is because these responses (i) can be excluded from the stockholding equations,
since they are never statistically di¤erent from zero, conditional on covariates, and
(ii) are reliable, e.g. for the average stock market participation rate in our sample
of 21.7%, respondents do seem to have on average an accurate perception of 19.39%
(see Table 7 of summary statistics). The results reported at the bottom of Table 5
under even-numbered columns conrm the latter, with quantitatively big estimated
e¤ects and F-statistics above 40 for the rst stage regressions of outer circle par-
ticipation or information, as a function of population participation or information
respectively.
Odd-numbered columns in Table 5 report results for stockholdings (columns
1 and 3) and the share of nancial wealth conditional on positive stockholdings
(columns 5 and 7), when information from or participation of the respondents
outer circle is allowed to be measured with error. Each of the nonlinear models,
i.e. probits for stockholding and tobits for the conditional shares, is estimated
jointly by maximum likelihood, under the null hypothesis of no measurement error.
The Wald 2(1) reported at the bottom of Table 5 has associated p-values above
20% for all specications, and thus we cannot reject the null of no measurement
error. The estimated e¤ects in Table 5 are about one order of magnitude larger
than the non-instrumented ones (as reported in Table 2) and are only statistically
signicant for the participation and information from the respondents nancial
circle; nevertheless, because our test indicates no measurement error, the preferred
results are those reported in Table 2.
Finally, to account for the possibility of functional form misspecication error,
33This is supported by the results reported under columns (5) and (7) where the peer e¤ects
from the outer circle are mistakenly excluded, resulting in an increase in the correlation in the error
terms of the group selection and the behavior within a group equations.
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Table 6 reports the results of allowing for interaction terms between inner and
outer circle peer e¤ect behavior or information and expectations of returns, under
columns 3 and 4 for stockholdings, and 7 and 8 for the conditional share, for our
baseline econometric specications (17) and (18). The interaction terms are never
statistically di¤erent from zero, and therefore not reported, while the non-interacted
estimated e¤ects are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results in Table 2
(reported again for comparison in Table 6, under columns 1 and 2 for stockholdings,
and under columns 5 and 6 for the conditional share). In fact, the results of the
estimation with interaction terms provide additional support for the presence of
the information channel, since one-standard-deviation increases in expectations (on
stockholdings) are almost twice as big at the extensive margin (77% bigger) and
about 25% larger at the intensive one, relative to the baseline results reported in
Table 2.
All in all, allowing for functional form misspecication, measurement error and
the possibility of selection provide useful robustness checks for our earlier ndings
and some additional support for the hypothesis that social interactions have a sig-
nicant informative, rather than purely mindless imitation, content.
4.4. Comparison to experimental evidence. Banerjee et al. (2013) and
Bursztyn et al. (2014) adopt experimental methods to disentangle information from
imitation e¤ects of the social circle. Banerjee et al. (2013) consider a novel micro-
nance program and replace the unconditional individual probability of participation
by the individual probability of participation conditional on individual information
sourced from friends. Once informed, they nd that an agents decision to partic-
ipate in the program is not signicantly inuenced by the fraction of her friends
participating, concluding that the inuence of peer participation is mainly an in-
formation e¤ect.34 It is possible to construct an extreme interpretation of their
ndings that would be in conict with ours. Under such an interpretation, if people
are generally aware of the existence of stocks, they should no longer be inuenced
by the share of their peers participating in them. Such an interpretation would be
in contrast to our ndings.
We opt for a di¤erent interpretation, which stresses the nature of the underlying
nancial product. The particular micronance product may have a much higher
probability of participation conditional on awareness than stocks do. To take an
extreme, if practically all people who know about the micronance product choose to
use it, the value of social links is in transmitting otherwise inaccessible information
34Their work relies heavily both on the identication of the actual network structure and on
control over the information spreading through it.
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and providing more information has no further e¤ects. Yet we know that stock
market participation is quite limited even among the many people aware of stocks
in developed economies. Thus, there is room for further information beyond the
existence of stocks to deliver e¤ects on stock market participation and on the degree
of exposure to stockholding risk.
Bursztyn et al. (2014) adopt a di¤erent experimental strategy and nd empirical
support for both information and imitation channels. They design a eld experi-
ment amongst socially paired investors of a Brazilian brokerage rm, and through
sequential randomization, they separate the e¤ect of a social peer actually purchas-
ing a new nancial product from being informed about it. This is accomplished
by randomly informing peers about products, but also controlling whether they are
able to invest in them or not. They are thus able to decompose the total e¤ect of
observing a peer hold a product into one that comes from the information that the
peer is interested in having the product and one that comes from the information
that the peer has been successful in acquiring the product. In this setup with fully
controlled information ows, knowledge that a peer is interested in owning the new
product is the only participation information that the respondent receives, and it
can have a sizeable e¤ect on the respondents decision. It is entirely possible that
observing peers participating in a mature and well-known product, such as stocks,
will only have an incremental e¤ect on the respondents own decision. The objec-
tive to control the information ow restricts attention to unknown products with
unknown appeal to others.
In our analysis, we deal with a well-known, yet information-intensive product in
a developed economy, namely stocks in France. The more limited role for mindless
imitation in the context of a widely known and mature product such as stocks is
quite intuitive: not much information is added by learning that an extra person
holds it, compared to learning this about a completely novel product.
Mature nancial products for which there is limited participation and uncon-
trolled access to information by potential investors abound in developed economies.
Population-wide surveys of behavior relating to such products can provide useful
additional insights to the interesting ndings of tightly managed experiments with
new or articial nancial products.
5. Conclusions
We provide a model where purely informative social interactions inuence subjective
expectations of future stock market returns as well as the demand for investing in
stocks, within a large e¢ cient asset market. The model shows that, conditional
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on investing, individuals collect more information from better informed peers, and
due to the improved precision that this generates, demand more stock in response
to positive pooled signals. By designing, collecting, and exploiting novel survey
data for a representative sample of the French population by age, wealth and asset
classes, collected in December 2014 and May 2015, we nd strong support for the
presence of informative social interactions, as well as some evidence for the presence
of mindless imitation of perceived participation behavior in the outer social circle
with whom respondents do not discuss nances.
Based on our ndings, the extent to which respondents perceive the nancial
circle to be informed about, or participating in the stock market, tends to inuence
perceptions of recent returns and only through them, expectations of future re-
turns. Stock market participation and the degree of exposure to stocks, conditional
on participation, are positively inuenced by stock market expectations. However,
this is not the only channel through which peers inuence stockholding behavior.
Even controlling for subjective mean expectations, stock market participation and
the conditional portfolio share are additionally positively inuenced by the extent
to which the nancial circle is informed or participating, both of which reduce the
posterior variance of expected returns. We did not nd evidence that the corre-
sponding attributes of the outer social circle inuence perceptions of past stock
returns or expectations of future returns. These ndings are consistent with the
notion that social interactions tend to be, at least in part, informative in relation to
stockholding. However, we did nd some evidence for the presence of imitation of
stock market participation observed in the outer social circle. Unlike what happens
with the nancial circle, respondents do not discuss nancial matters with mem-
bers of this outer circle, and this creates a presumption for the presence of mindless
imitation in the participation decision alongside informative social interactions.
We have followed a three-pronged approach to dealing with unobserved hetero-
geneity being the source of these results. First, we distinguish between attributes of
the nancial and of the outer circle: unobserved heterogeneity would tend to make
both relevant rather than only one, as is observed in several of our results. Since
those results are also conditional on corresponding population attributes, selection
and correlated e¤ects should also be less of a concern. Second, we perform placebo
tests, where respondentsperceptions regarding the nancial and the outer circle are
reshu­ ed across respondents of the same age, education, and region of residence.
We nd that such reshu­ ing eliminates the estimated e¤ects. Third, we adopt a bi-
variate probit specication which recognizes the possibly joint nature of the decision
to hold stocks and to form a nancial circle. When we treat group choice and be-
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havior within a group as a set of joint outcomes, the null of independence among the
two choices cannot be rejected in our sample, and our estimates tend to be similar
regardless of whether we allow for a joint decision or consider stockholding choices
separately. As a nal robustness exercise, we use four questions from the TNS2015
questionnaire (questions C5, D6, D7 and D8) that ask respondents to report how
they perceive themselves relative to those in their social and nancial circles, in terms
of professional standing, value of their nancial assets and qualications.35 The re-
ported empirical results are conditional on these social utility covariates, which are
never statistically signicant, providing further evidence against homophily driving
our model-backed interpretation of the estimated information peer e¤ects.
Informative social interactions imply a potentially powerful channel through
which nancial information and nancial literacy can permeate through the econ-
omy, even if the original information or nancial education content reaches a rela-
tively small segment of the population. They point to a social multiplier in nancial
education or nancial information even in countries with advanced nancial de-
velopment and in products that are mature and widely known, as is the case of
stockholding in France. They provide a (partial or superior) substitute for nan-
cial advice, if ill-conceived, poorly incentivized, or hardly trusted. Finally, they are
likely to grow in importance, as use of social media and the potential to reach more
people with new information spread rapidly. Yet the data also indicate the presence
of some mindless imitation in stockholding. This, along with the inequities involved
in having access to less informed peers, suggest caution in relying exclusively on in-
formative social interactions for the spread of useful information and best nancial
practices.
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TABLE 7: Summary statistics
Patrimoine INSEE 2014-15 TNS 2014 & 2015 merged
VARIABLES Mean Mean St.Dev. Min. Max. Observations
Pr(Stocks>0) 0.129 0.217 0.412 0 1 3,606
%FW 15 21.4
(5:324)
22.46
(14:53)
1
(0)
100 719
(2;891)
N in Social Circle n/a 52.56 77.01 0 999 2,334
N in Financial Circle n/a 3.160 6.746 0 100 2,243
% SC Particip. n/a 10.74 15.72 0 90 809
% SC Informed n/a 12.57 15.82 0 80 871
% FC Particip. n/a 18.93 28.25 0 100 674
% FC Informed n/a 20.50 27.59 0 100 740
% OC Particip. n/a 13.43 17.21 0 100 526
% OC Informed n/a 11.56 17.65 0 90.05 472
% Population Particip. n/a 19.39 14.53 0 90 1,112
% Population Informed n/a 22.88 16.69 0 100 1,171
SC Rel. Stand. Prof. + n/a 29.34 27.02 0 100 734
SC Rel. Stand. Prof. - n/a 23.76 23.24 0 100 734
FC Rel. Stand. Prof. + n/a 36.88 35.03 0 100 518
FC Rel. Stand. Prof. - n/a 18.73 25.61 0 100 518
FC Rel. Stand. Wealth + n/a 1.775 0.653 1 3 2,261
FC Rel. Stand. Edu. + n/a 1.916 0.663 1 3 2,275
Expec. R n/a 1.62 8.944 -62.5 62.5 2,535
St. dev. Expec. R n/a 6.699 7.082 0 38.7 2,535
D(StDev.ER=0) n/a 0.343 0.475 0 1 2,743
Perc. R n/a 3.607 12.04 -37.5 37.5 2,328
St. dev. Perc. R. n/a 6.649 7.171 0 31.15 2,328
Risk aversion n/a 34.90 11.76 0 40 3,670
Borrowing & Liq.Constr. n/a 0.0292 0.168 0 1 3,670
Age<35 0.177 0.170 0.376 0 1 3,670
35<Age<50 0.264 0.244 0.429 0 1 3,670
50<Age<65 0.276 0.275 0.446 0 1 3,670
Age>65 0.283 0.311 0.463 0 1 3,670
Male 0.604 0.464 0.499 0 1 3,670
Married 0.732 0.602 0.490 0 1 3,670
Children at Home>0 0.372 0.241 0.428 0 1 3,670
College or more 0.363 0.376 0.484 0 1 3,670
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TABLE 7: Summary statistics (continued)
Patrimoine INSEE 2014-15 TNS 2014 & 2015 merged
VARIABLES Mean Mean St.Dev. Min. Max. Observations
(continues from previous page)
reg1 0.175 0.168 0.374 0 1 3,670
reg2 0.060 0.0635 0.244 0 1 3,670
reg3 0.083 0.0817 0.274 0 1 3,670
reg4 + 0.0826 0.275 0 1 3,670
reg5 0.166 0.0959 0.295 0 1 3,670
reg6 0.135 0.142 0.349 0 1 3,670
reg7 0.111 0.115 0.319 0 1 3,670
reg8 0.122 0.123 0.328 0 1 3,670
reg9 0.122 0.128 0.334 0 1 3,670
Employed 0.545 0.518 0.500 0 1 3,670
Self-employed 0.053 0.0349 0.183 0 1 3,670
Retired 0.359 0.311 0.463 0 1 3,670
Assets<74999 0.376 0.275 0.447 0 1 3,087
75000<Assets<224999 0.242 0.319 0.466 0 1 3,087
224500<Assets<449999 0.231 0.279 0.448 0 1 3,087
450000<Assets 0.150 0.127 0.333 0 1 3,087
Income<11999 0.395 0.305 0.460 0 1 3,590
12000<Income<19999 0.195 0.279 0.449 0 1 3,590
20000<Income<29999 0.201 0.274 0.446 0 1 3,590
Income>30000 0.209 0.142 0.349 0 1 3,590
Saving=0 n/a 0.324 0.468 0 1 3,519
0<Saving<999 n/a 0.293 0.455 0 1 3,519
1000<Saving<4999 n/a 0.280 0.449 0 1 3,519
Saving>5000 n/a 0.103 0.305 0 1 3,519
NR(Assets) n/a 0.159 0.366 0 1 3,670
NR(Income) n/a 0.022 0.146 0 1 3,670
NR(Saving) n/a 0.041 0.199 0 1 3,670
NR(SC Rel. Stand. Prof.) n/a 0.332 0.471 0 1 3,670
DK(SC Rel. Stand. Prof.) n/a 0.469 0.499 0 1 3,670
NR(FC Rel. Stand. Prof.) n/a 0.352 0.478 0 1 3,670
DK(FC Rel. Stand. Prof.) n/a 0.507 0.500 0 1 3,670
NR(FC Rel. Stand. Wealth) n/a 0.384 0.486 0 1 3,670
NR(FC Rel. Stand. Edu.) n/a 0.380 0.485 0 1 3,670
Source: 2014 INSEE Patrimoinesurvey and authorscalculations on merged TNS 2014 & 2015 data set.
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APPENDICES, FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A. Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium
We conjecture that the risky asset price has the form
p = 0 +
nX
j=1
jxj   Zn; (20)
and imposing market clearing we have that
P
iD

i = Zn: Let rij = gij=
Pn
k=1 gik be
the intensity of the link between nodes i and j, which denes the intensity matrix
R = [rij ] . Then, we can dene S  Cov (R) = RRT ;so that R = K 1G =
K 1A 1;where K is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements the sums of the
rows of G, i.e. the strengths of the nodes, K = diag [k1; :::; kn] ; and therefore
S  K 1WK 1, where the matrix W is dened by W = GGT = A 1A. We
note that because A is symmetric and aij 2 f0; 1g , it is trivially true that
Wii = ki =
nX
j=1
aij=s
2
j :
Finally we make the following assumptions:
A1. kWk1 = o (n), i.e.
lim
n!1
kWk1
n
= 0 (21)
A2. limn!1 1n
Pn
i=1
ki
i
= +o (1) : This is slightly modied version of the assump-
tion made by Ozsoylev and Walden (2011). It is written in terms of ki, i.e.
the strength of links, weighted by the risk aversions, but has the same inter-
pretation as in Ozsoylev and Walden (2011), i.e. that the average strength
of nodes weighted by risk aversion (average risk-adjusted connectedness) is ,
and is nite.
A3. The risk aversion coe¢ cients come from a distribution such that the harmonic
mean is nite as n!1, i.e.
lim
n!1
nPn
i=1
1
i
= ^ <1:
A4. The limit
lim
n!1 ki = k

i <1
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exists and is nite. The interpretation of this assumption is that no investor
can be a node with very large strength as the network becomes larger. In other
words, no agent can have too many connections that have very precise signals.
This excludes scenarios of an informationally superior elite in the network.
Under these assumptions can extend Ozsoylev and Waldens results to the fol-
lowing:
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions A1-A4, with probability 1, the equilibrium asset
price converges to
p = 0 + 
 X    Z
where
A =

^2
0 = 

 X2 + Z2
2^2 + 2

 =
2^2 + 2
2^2 + 2 + 22
 = 
and the optimal demand for the risky asset for an investor i is
Di  Di (xi; p) =
^
i
 X2 + Z2
^22 + 2

  ^
i

2
2 (^2 + )

p+
ki
i
(xi   p)
The proof follows the same steps as in Ozsoylev and Walden with some suitable
modications. The strategy of the proof is to follow the guess-and-verifyapproach,
and the main steps are:
1. Conjecture a functional (linear) form for the price, with unknown coe¢ cients.
2. Derive beliefs for the agents as a function of the price coe¢ cients (using
Bayesian updating).
3. Derive the optimal demands for the agents given their endogenous beliefs.
4. Impose market clearing and solve for the stock price.
5. Impose rational expectations (i.e. equalize coe¢ cients) and conrm that the
corresponding system of equation generates a solution, which will then provide
solutions for the price coe¢ cients.
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6. Check, with asymptotic arguments that conditions required to ensure that the
coe¢ cients exist (i.e. the system has solution) as n ! 1, are satised given
the assumptions A1-A4.
The detailed steps of the proof are available upon request.
B. Definitions of Variables
Table 7 reports summary sample statistics for all the variables we have used for the
analysis, and compares them to similar measures (when available) in the 2014-2015
Patrimoine INSEE Survey, collected by the French National Institute of Statistics
(INSEE). This is a French Household Wealth Survey, which targets around 20,000
households randomly selected through a process that ensures representativeness of
social categories at the national level. Respondents are interviewed face-to-face,
and are asked to report householdsreal-estate, nancial and professional assets and
liabilities in France. It oversamples the rich (just as most national wealth surveys
do, like the US PSID or the Italian SHIW), and has been elded in 1986, 1991-1992
(Actifs nanciers), 1997-1998, 2003-2004, 2009-2010 and 2014-2015 (Patrimoine)
without a longitudinal dimension. Since 2017, and in partnership with the Banque
de France, it inputs the French part of the Household Finance and Consumption
Survey (HFCS), a harmonized system of wealth surveys supervised by the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB). From 2014, the French Household Wealth Survey takes
place every three years, and contains a subsample with a longitudinal dimension.
The new panel establishes, complementary to the face-to-face surveys, a short self-
administered follow-up survey (internet/paper) between waves to reduce attrition.
In addition to describing the distribution of assets and liabilities and their evolution,
the surveys also contain comprehensive information on factors accounting for wealth
accumulation: family and professional biography, inheritances and gifts, income and
nancial situation.
B.1. Expec. R. and Perc. R.: Subjective Mean Expectations and Mean
Perceptions of Stock Market Returns. To measure expectations, we elicited
probabilistically respondentsbeliefs about the cumulative stock market (CAC-40
index) return over a ve-year horizon, Pt+5; relative to December 2014, Pt; from the
following question (translated wording):
C39: In ve years from now, do you think that the stock market...  (For each
category write down how likely the occurrence is by assigning a value between
0 and 100. The sum of all your answers must be equal to 100):
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... will have increased by more than 25%
... will have increased by 10 to 25%
... will have increased by less than 10%
... will be the same
... will have decreased by less than 10%
... will have decreased by 10 to 25%
... will have decreased by more than 25%
Question C39 inquires respondent i about the subjective relative likelihood of
occurrence, pit+1;k, of each of the seven alternative scenarios, k = 1; :::; 7. Each sce-
nario represents a possible outcome range for the index percentage change between
t and t + 5, Rt+1(5)  Pt+5Pt   1.36 Questions C40 and C41 provide subjective up-
per and lower bounds for the percentage change, Rimax and R
i
min respectively. The
corresponding outcome ranges are:
Rt+12
8<:[ Rimin; 25)| {z }
k=1
; [ 25; 10]| {z };
k=2
( 10; 0)| {z };
k=3
f0g|{z};
k=4
(0; 10)| {z };
k=5
[10; 25]| {z }
k=6
; (25; Rimax]| {z }
k=7
9=;
and respondentssubjective likelihoods are accordingly:
pit+1;k Pri (Rt+12 k) = Pri

Pt+5
Pt
 1 2 k

;8i
and zero elsewhere, i.e. Rt+1 2 ( 1; Rimin) [ (Rimax;+1): Table 5 reports sum-
mary sample statistics for respondentsanswers regarding expectations about stock
market returns, imposing a uniform distribution within the di¤erent outcome ranges.
36We follow the standard convention in nance for long-horizon returns, and let 1 + Rt+1(s)
denote the stock market index gross return over s periods ahead (hence the subindex t+ 1), which
is equal to the product of the s single-period (or yearly) returns:
1 +Rt+1(s) =
s 1Q
f=0
(1 +Rt+1+f ) =
s 1Q
f=0

It+1+f
It+f

Similarly, we let 1+Rt(s) denote the stock market index gross return over the most recent s periods
from date t  s to date t (hence the subindex t):
1 +Rt(s) =
s 1Q
b=0
(1 +Rt b) =
s 1Q
b=0

It b
It 1 b

See Campbell et al. (1997) for details.
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On average, households appear more pessimistic and uncertain than the historical
record would predict.
To quantitatively assess how factually informed respondents are, we elicit proba-
bilistically respondentsperceptions about the most recent cumulative stock market
return (CAC-40 index) over the three years, Pt 3; immediately prior to elding the
survey (December 2014), Pt; as follows (translated wording):
C42: Over the last three years, do you think that the stock market... (For each
category write down how likely the occurrence is by assigning a value between
0 and 100. The sum of all your answers must be equal to 100):
... has increased by more than 25%
... has increased by 10 to 25%
... has increased by less than 10%
... has remained the same
... has decreased by less than 10%
... has decreased by 10 to 25%
... has decreased by more than 25%
Similarly to Question C39, Question C42 asks household i about the subjective
relative likelihood of occurrence, pit;k, of each of the seven alternative scenarios,
k = 1; :::; 7. Each scenario represents a possible outcome range for the percentage
change in the index between t 3 and t, Rt(3)  PtPt 3  1. Probabilistic elicitation of
realized outcomes thus enables us to measure how uncertain they are when conveying
their answers. Since ranges k = 1 and k = 7 are unbounded, we set (Rmax; Rmin) to
match observed values. The outcome ranges for Rt are identical to those of question
C39. Accordingly, householdssubjective likelihoods are given by:
pit;k Pri (Rt2 k) = Pri

Pt
Pt 3
 1 2 k

; 8i
Three years prior to the time when the survey was conducted (December 2011), the
stock market index was only slightly above the oors reached after the dot-com and
Lehman Brothers busts. But, between late December 2011 (CAC 40 = 3159:81)
and late December 2014 (CAC 40 = 4252:29), the index had increased an overall
34.57%. Figure 1 in the main text shows the time window chosen within the wan-
derings of the CAC-40 index between 1990 and 2016. Table 5 reports summary
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sample statistics for respondentsanswers regarding perceptions and beliefs about
stock market returns, imposing a uniform distribution within the di¤erent outcome
ranges. A striking nding is that households are on average also pessimistic re-
garding the most recently realized three-year cumulative stock market return (Dec.
2011-Dec. 2014). Although this might be due to imperfect memory given the un-
usually long horizon, it might also be related to the 2007 Lehman Brothersbust
being overweighted on respondentsmemory (Hurd et al., 2011), even if outside the
questions time window. The big spread around the realized three-year cumulative
stock market perceived return came as no surprise, and it captures factual ambigu-
ity. In addition, it is remarkable that it remains smaller than the spread around the
expected ve-year ahead cumulative stock market return.
Figures B1a and B1b below report the histograms of respondentsanswers to
the subjective expectations and perceptions questions, C39 and C42 respectively,
for both the mean (left panel) and the standard deviation of mean responses (right
panel). Figure B1a (right panel) conveys that around 34% of respondents reported
a zero standard deviation of subjective mean expected returns for the ve-year
ahead stock market cumulative return, in clear dissonance with available historical
evidence. This misperception of stock market risk motivates the denition of a cat-
egorical variable Certain Expec. R., which takes value 1 if the respondent reports
a zero standard deviation of mean expected returns, and takes value 0 otherwise.
Figure B1a:
Histograms of the subjective mean (left panel) expected ve-year ahead cumulative return,
and its standard deviation (right panel); TNS2014.
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Figure B1b:
Histograms of the subjective mean (left panel) perceived three-year cumulative realized
return, and its standard deviation (right panel); TNS2014.
Arrondel et al. (2014) report that categorical answers to frequency, variety
and access specialized media, advice from professionals, as well as the number of
stock market transactions carried over the last year, increase the likelihood of being
factually informed. Interestingly, parentsstock ownership status (cultural trans-
mission), parentseducational attainment or family background do not increase the
odds of being factually informed, and actually signicantly decreases them for those
who follow family advice. Since those who follow friendsadvice are more likely to
be informed, they interpret the evidence as being consistent with social interactions
being instrumental in gathering information (as in Hong et al., 2004). On the other
hand, a measure of optimism (being lucky in life) has a negative impact on being
informed, indicating that an overcondence biasis not present once gender is con-
ditioned upon: although males appear better informed, supporting more optimistic
forward looking expectations, optimists appear consistently worse informed. On the
basis of that nding, they argue that the ndings of Bilias, Georgarakos and Halias-
sos (2010), consistent with inertia in householdsportfolios, can be reconciled with
Guiso and Jappellis (2005) ndings, consistent with excess trading even amongst
the general population. Importantly, they do not nd evidence of temporal or risk
preferences determining information sets, in line with Van Nieuwerburgh and Veld-
kamp (2010). In addition, and although total wealth does not increase the odds of
being informed, income does, in line with a costly information acquisition interpre-
tation (Peress, 2004). Finally, they report that optimists and low income/income
constrained respondents are less likely to be informed, consistent with rational inat-
tention theory (Sims, 2003). Overall, those ndings support probabilistically elicited
perceptions as a sensible measure of factual information.
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B.2. %FW: Share of nancial wealth invested in the stock market. Re-
spondents report their total nancial wealth and the share of their total nan-
cial wealth invested in the stock market, in questions C16 and C19 respectively
(TNS2014). Question C16 asks respondents to report their total nancial wealth
(excluding housing and own businesses) within given brackets (see below for further
details). The translated wording for question C19 is:
C19: Approximately what percentage of your total nancial wealth have you in-
vested in listed or unlisted shares, directly or in unit trusts, in a personal
equity plan or a mutual fund (yourself or a member of your household)? If
you dont have any, please answer 0%.
We have a total of 2,891 observations for these questions. Out of 3,780 survey
respondents, about 76% responded meaningfully. The mean percentage of nancial
wealth invested in the stock market is 5.32%, and the standard deviation is 14.52%.
B.3. Population, social and nancial interactions. These variables are de-
scribed in detail in section 3. Summary statistics for questions C1, D1, C6, C7 and
D16 are presented in Table 5.
B.4. Measures of social relative standing. The survey contains four mea-
sures of the respondents relative standing in terms of social circle and nancial
circle outcomes:
SC Rel. Stand. Profes.: In the survey (question C5), the respondent is asked about
the percentage shares of people in the respondents social circle that have a
professional status above, similar, or below the respondents, labelled SC Rel.
Stand. Profes. +, SC Rel. Stand. Profes. =, or SC Rel. Stand. Profes. -
respectively. Since answers are asked to add up to 100, the reference category
is SC Rel. Stand. Profes. =. About 47% of respondents chose the option
to tick the box conveying I do not know, which informs the corresponding
DK(SC Rel. Stand. Profes.) dummy variable in Table 5. Non-respondents
account for 33%, and are coded as NR(SC Rel. Stand. Profes.).
FC Rel. Stand. Profes.: In the survey (question D6), the respondent is asked about
the percentage share of people in the respondents nancial circle that have
a professional status above/similar/below the respondents, labelled FC Rel.
Stand. Profes. +, FC Rel. Stand. Profes. =, or FC Rel. Stand. Profes. -
respectively. Since answers are asked to add up to 100, the reference category
is FC Rel. Stand. Profes. =. About 51% of respondents chose the option
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to tick the box conveying I do not know, which informs the corresponding
DK(FC Rel. Stand. Profes.) dummy variable in Table 5. Non-respondents
account for 35%, and are coded as NR(FC Rel. Stand. Profes.)
FC Rel.Stand. +Wealth: In the survey (question D7), the respondent is asked
about her/his relative standing in terms of wealth relative to the average
wealth of the respondents nancial circle, and is given three options: below
the average, approximately at the average, or above the average. Responses
were coded as ordered categories in increasing order from 1 to 3. About 38%
chose not to respond, and are coded as NR(FC Rel.Stand. +Wealth)in Table
5.
FC Rel.Stand. +Edu.: In the survey (question D8), the respondent is asked about
her/his relative standing in terms of educational attainment relative to the
average educational attainment of the respondents nancial circle, and is given
three options: below the average, approximately at the averageor above
the average. Responses were coded as ordered categories in increasing order
from 1 (below) to 3 (above). Around 38% are non-responses, which are coded
as NR(FC Rel.Stand. +Edu.) in Table 5.
B.5. Demographics and other control Variables.
Endowments.
Total wealth: In the survey (question C29), the respondent is asked which of the
ten predened available brackets corresponds to the households non-human
wealth, including housing, estates and professional assets (without excluding
debt):37 Less than 8,000, between 8,000 and 14,999, between 15,000 and
39,999, between 40,000 and 74,999, between 75,000 and 149,999, between
150,000 and 224,999, between 225,000 and 299,999, between 300,000 and
449,999, between 450,000 and 749,999and 750,000 or more. Total wealth
is given in Euros. From the empirical distribution we obtain total wealth
quartiles, the bounds of which are given by 74,999, 224,999and 449,999.
The reference category is the rst quartile, less than 74,999.
37 If we were interested in a continuous measure, we would implement the method of simulated
residuals (Gourieroux et al. 1987). We would then regress an ordered probit of the respondents
total wealth (bracket) on demographic and socio-economic household characteristics. Once we
would have the estimated total wealth, a normally distributed error would be added. We would
then check if the value falls inside the bracket originally chosen by the individual. If not, another
normal error would be added and so on until we the true interval is correctly predicted. Doing
so would allow us to overcome the non-response problem for some households. Would there be a
missing value, the predicted value plus a normal error would be directly used.
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Total nancial wealth: In the survey (question C16), the respondent is asked which
of the ten predened available brackets corresponds to the households nancial
wealth (excluding housing, estates and professional assets), including cash
and positive balances on checking accounts: Less than 500, between 1,500
and 2,999, between 3,000 and 7,999, between 8,000 and 14,999, between
15,000 and 29,999, between 30,000 and 44,999, between 45,000 and 74,999,
between 75,000 and 149,999, between 150,000 and 249,999and 250,000 or
more. Total nancial wealth is given in Euros.
Income: For the income of the household, the survey (question A12) asks the re-
spondent which of the nine predened available brackets better corresponds to
her situation: Less than 8,000, between 8,000 and 11,999, between 12,000
and 15,999, between 16,000 and 19,999, between 20,000 and 29,999, be-
tween 30,000 and 39,999, between 40,000 and 59,999, 60,000 or moreand
No income. Income refers to the respondents annual income (earnings, pen-
sions, bonuses, etc.) in Euros, net of social contributions but before personal
income taxes.38 In addition, TNS reports also the net gross monthly income
of the household, in Euros. From the empirical distribution, we obtain the in-
come quartiles the bounds of which are given by 11,999, 19,999and 29,999.
The reference category is the rst quartile, less than 11,999.
Occupational status: (of the household head) the TNS 2014 survey asks respon-
dents about their occupation, grouped into ve categories: inactive, un-
employed, employedwhich includes white-collar (liberal and managerial
employees) and blue-collarworkers (employees, clerical and manual work-
ers); self-employedwhich includes farmers, artisans and shop and business
owners, and retired. Finally, we group the rst two categories into one, the
reference category.
Preferences.
Absolute risk aversion: The following question is asked to the respondent: If
someone suggests that you make an investment, eSi, whereby you have one
chance out of two win 5000 euros and one chance out of two of losing the
capital invested, how much (as a maximum) will you invest? The question
aims at eliciting the taste for risk from each respondent i; with preferences
ui(:), from the following equality:
ui(wi) =
1
2
ui(wi + 5; 000) +
1
2
ui(wi   Zi)  Eui(wi + eSi)
38When the survey took place, income in France was not taxed at the source.
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Figure 3: Histogram of responses to the hypothetical lottery that enables elicitation of the
respondents coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion (CARA) -TNS 2014 survey question C44.
The coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion can be then obtained from a second
order Taylor expansion, as Ai(wi) = 2(5000   Zi)=(50002 + Z2i ), where Zi is
the amount that the respondent declares to be willing to invest. Those who
declare Zi < 5000 are risk-averse Zi = 5000, are risk-neutral and Zi > 5000
are risk-lovers. The outcome range for the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion
Ai(wi) is [0; 40]: A total of 3,335 respondents answered the question, with
a mean response of 38.40 and a median value of 39.92. Fig. 3 displays the
histogram of responses, which is very skewed to the left but remains within the
range responses found in the literature. Further details regarding the measure
of absolute risk aversion can be found in Guiso and Paiellas (2008) work.
Demographics.
Age: it is a continuous variable equal to the age of the household head. Respon-
dents age range is in between 19 and 94. We group respondents into four
categories: younger than 35, between 35 and 49 years old, between 50 and
64 years oldor older than 65. Depending on the age bracket within which
respondentsage falls, it takes value 1 within it and zero otherwise.
Gender : it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is a male, and is
equal to 0, if a female.
Marital status: Marital status is based on current legal marital status. Respondents
who are married or/and living with a partner are coded as 1, and 0 otherwise.
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Children at home: it is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the respondent replies that
there is (a positive number of) children living at home with their parent(s),
and is coded as 0 otherwise.
Constraints.
Liquidity and borrowing constrained : Respondents are asked if they held an out-
standing (negative) debt balance, and if not, why. We then constructed a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent answers the question in
the categories because my debt application was turned downor because I
did not submit an application for fear of being turned down, and value 0
otherwise.
Saving : Question C73 in the TNS 2014 survey asks the respondent about total net
household saving over the last 12 months. Six brackets are provided, in Euros,
of which the rst is zero (we have not saved). Around 31% of respondents
report no savings over the last 12 months. From the empirical distribution,
we obtain the saving quartiles the bounds of which are given by 0, 999and
4,999. The reference category is the rst quartile.
Region of residence is a categorical variable, with nine possible categories repre-
senting the respondents region of residence: reg 1is Paris, reg 2is Nord,
reg 3is Est, reg 4is BP Est, reg 5is BP Ouest, reg 6is Ouest, reg
7is Sud Ouest, reg 8is Sud Estand reg 9is Mediterranée.
Information.
Education is a captured by a single categorical variable which takes value 1 if the
respondent completed college or a diploma above (BAs, BScs, MScs, MBAs,
professional certications, PhDs and postdoctoral students), and takes value
zero otherwise, i.e. High school or less (primary and secondary) and if the
respondent failed to complete college education (technical degrees beyond high
school but below college, including professional and vocational degrees).
